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Introduction 
 
I want to begin this presentation by suggesting that those penal activists 
and practitioners who have been working on both sides of the Irish Sea 
over the last few years to limit the damage that our respective 
governments regularly inflict on those often disadvantaged people who 
beak the law have not had an easy time.  
 
In the UK both the Labour and Conservative parties  - at least before 
the present fiscal crisis – promised to significantly expand the prison 
population, and Ian O’Donnell has reminded us that as late as 2008 the 
Irish government was planning a similar expansion, even though the 
population of sentenced prisoners had changed very little, if at all 
(O’Donnell 2008) And some of you will no doubt have also read one of 
Ireland’s most experienced prison education administrators Kevin 
Warner’s address to a Nordic conference in Tromso at about the same 
time hinting at possible wider (and unwelcome) policy exchanges when 
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he suggested that the “pressures” on prisons had led to “things getting 
very out of hand in other countries, especially in English speaking 
countries”, a very timely warning, not least about developments in 
America (Warner 2008) 
 
This drift, towards more punitive times, when even those who manage to 
escape a prison sentence are being subjected to ever more surveillance 
in the community through measures such as curfews, asbos and 
electronic tagging, presents us with something of a paradox, since many 
English speaking countries where this punitive drift is taking place have 
experienced declining crime rates, so most people should feel safer than 
– rather than more insecure – than they have ever been. (Roberts et al 
1998; Pratt et al 2005 et al; Pratt 2007) I hope to return to this paradox 
later. 
 
I acknowledge, of course, that the significance and nature of this 
punitive drift is contested. Some see it as a fundamental and lasting 
change that challenges Norbert Elias’s view that modern societies have 
turned their backs on brutal, cruel and unusual punishments. (Garland 
1990). Others, as you will know, stand by Elias arguing that in the 
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longer term the current punitive climate will be seen as minor deviation, 
that manacled prisoners, the rising number of those dying through 
lethal injection, should not divert out attention from the longer 
historical arc. (Matthews 2005; Garland 2001)  
 
Still others cast doubt on whether there has really been a punitive drift, 
arguing that if you broaden out the penal archipelago beyond the prison 
per se it arguable that some western societies have become less punitive. 
Ian O’Donnell and Sean O’Sullivan made this case for the Irish 
Republic in their swashbuckling article in Punishment just last year. 
(O’Sullivan and O’Donnell  2007; Matthews 2005) 
 
So we have to accept that we have a serious academic argument here, 
and I know that several of you at this conference have made impressive 
contributions to this ongoing debate. I do believe, however, that just 
about all the parties in the debate acknowledge that in spite of this 
ongoing academic jousting (for example, Hallsworth 2004) there is a 
perception among influential reform groups and penal administrators 
that we are seeing a drift towards less liberal penal regimes and that 
penal optimism is in pretty short supply.  
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This not to say that there not some progressive penal practices on both 
sides of the water, or to deny that there are more tolerant voices to be 
heard, but even when we allow for these qualifications, liberal sentiment 
in both our countries has been, rightly or wrongly, on the back foot. 
 
In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why some penal 
activists, prison administrators and academics look abroad to countries 
that have more progressive penal practises. There is nothing ignoble 
about this. Borrowing “best practice”, to use modern management 
jargon, is sensible. So, for example, Kevin Warner looks north and 
hopes – and here I quote directly - -  
 
“that if Nordic countries can keep their sane and humane penal policies 
in these difficult times, [they] may, from [the] northern edge of Europe, 
help the rest of us in the future to abandon the madness that has 
overtaken so many, and share with us [their] knowledge of how to deal 
with the troublesome in or societies in a wiser way.” (Warner 2008)  
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He then went on to compare these countries as keepers of the liberal 
faith in penal matters rather as Celtic monasteries had sustained 
Christianity in the Dark Ages.  
 
While we can understand this somewhat rhetorical flourish, it came at 
the end of a very inspiring paper that attempted – very well I thought - 
to portray the basic strengths of Nordic penal practice; the problem I 
have is that all too often comparative work like this is undertaken 
without sufficient attention being paid to the particular (and dynamic) 
policy making processes in which specific, national penal policies are 
generated.  
 
And the problem with this is that without considering how these dynamic 
policy processes work, abroad or at home, we cannot sensibly devise, let 
alone borrow from elsewhere, strategies to combat penal populism. 
 
Irish and English Voices 
 
Let me give you two examples of how this works, one commentator is 
from Ireland, one from England. I should say that both write admirably 
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and with integrity, and more to the point, I doubt if the penal 
philosophy that inspires them is much different from my own.  
 
Now on the Irish side I have already drawn attention to Kevin Warner’s 
interest in the Nordic states, and he reinforced this interest in a paper 
he gave to this very conference at UCD last year entitled, Resisting the 
New Punitiveness; Penal Policy making in Denmark, Finland and 
Norway. (Warner 2009) This pushed further his appreciation of how 
these countries were responding to the new harsher penal climate and 
then, having asserted that there “were many points of similarity in 
terms of history, economic and social structures” between these 
countries and Ireland he lists eight possible “modelling” lessons for the 
Irish Republic, including the practical possibility of a reduction of 1.000 
in the existing prison population.  
 
Now, I am not much at odds with this, or many of the other seven 
progressive possibilities that Warner lists, however he tells us little about 
how public support for these might be mobilised.  
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It is true that in five or six lines at the very last paragraph of his paper 
he makes reference to Loader (2006) and the need to engage with public 
opinion. But this is little more than a very under - developed after 
thought, and not much use it seems to me to those in Ireland, who, to 
take from the title of his own paper, are in the business of “resisting the 
new punitiveness”.  
 
In other words, it offers an inviting menu of things that other more 
progressive penal systems do, but little analysis of how penal policy is 
made in the Republic, or how its processes might be negotiated secure 
these desired changes. 
 
It is, of course perfectly reasonable for Kevin Warner to claim that he 
never set out to do this, to provide strategic insights into how the Irish 
penal policy making process work, how it might be engaged with to 
secure these changes. And I would be the first to accept this defence, but 
I also think I would be reasonably justified in questioning the utility or 
limitations of such an approach as a contribution to the struggle to 
secure a more progressive penal policy - that requires thinking in 
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broader terms, and critically, it involves thinking about the changing   
policy processes in which politicians operate. 
 
In an attempt to be even handed here, I can think of English 
commentators who have made, if not the same limited pitch, have also 
under theorised the policy making process in modern democracies. The 
most obvious of these is perhaps Andrew Rutherford’s. In his well 
received text Transforming Criminal Justice Policy (Rutherford 1995)  
Rutherford discusses, among others, the work of Scandinavian 
criminologists Nils Christie (1982) and Thomas Mathiesen (1995) and 
some of the high ranking Nordic officials, sources later referred to by 
Kevin Warner whose work I have just referred to. 
 
Rutherford is much impressed by Nils Christie’s idea of a moral 
community that depends on “the involvement of an inner core of 
decision makers, consisting of experts and other elites”. Rutherford 
takes the existence of such a community as being necessary to sustain a 
progressive penal policy.  
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He gives the example of Finland where no more than twenty five key 
decision makers, civil servants, judges, administrators, and academics 
were involved in reducing that country’s unusually large prison 
population. (Rutherford 1995; Tornudd 1993) Members of this group 
often met informally, sometimes in each other’s homes. In the British 
context he specifically identifies senior civil servant David Faulkner as 
being a leading light in sustaining such a moral community in the UK. 
(Rutherford 1995)He is far too modest to say this, but as chairperson of 
the Howard League for Penal reform, Rutherford also contributed to 
the informal gatherings that constituted this moral community in the 
UK.   
 
Building on the idea of a moral community, and adapting a framework 
used by Thomas Mathiesen, Rutherford tries to theorise about the 
position some of the other actors involved in the penal policy making 
process and to explore the relationship between them.  
 
So for Rutherford there is an outer sphere of opinion that involves what 
can be identified as the broader public, including the mass media.  
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Then there is an inner sphere. These are the people who run the 
criminal justice system, including prison administrators, magistrates, 
judges and the like. Finally, there is what we have identified as the 
moral community or the kernel as Rutherford calls it.  
 
There is, of course, a degree of overlap between these three schematic 
groups. For example, there are many progressive criminal lawyers, 
justices’ clerks and probation officers who can rightfully claim a place 
in the moral community or the kernel. Also, of course, the relationship 
between these groups is always in a state of flux.  
 
The moral community will often have its back to the wall, trying to 
sustain a principled liberal position against the latest public outrage. So 
for example, the moral community in the UK managed to secure the 
Criminal Justice Act (1991) which aimed to reduce the prison 
population, but could not sustain it, the inner and outer spheres 
intruded and upset the proposed new order. Similarly, the moral 
community in the Netherlands lost ground in the early 1990s. (van 
Swaaningen and de Jonge 1995)  
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Setbacks like this are normal; the moral community needs to be vigilant 
and flexible, willing to re-group, devise new strategies, and propose new 
measures. True, this is probably more difficult to manage in large 
complex, industrial societies like the UK, arguably more difficult than in 
Norway.  
 
Overall though, I think Rutherford’s heuristic framework is a 
reasonable way of understanding how penal policy has been 
traditionally made, not only in Nordic countries, but in England and 
Wales also.  
 
And in looking at Rutherford’s contribution you cannot say that he has 
not thought about the policy making process and offered us some pointers 
about how we might intervene to produce a more progressive penal 
politics.  
 
He has moved on from simply looking at the progressive characteristics 
of Nordic penal practice as Warner does and at least left us left us with 
some sort of framework to explore how these practices have been (and 
might be) be politically engineered in other western democracies. 
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And certainly there is a lot of empirical evidence, as my own work on 
England and Wales over the years has shown, to support the view that a 
small, unrepresentative community of reformers, fearing the “ignorant” 
public voice and “hard-line ” operatives, have sought to shape the 
direction of penal policy making in the countries that are represented 
here at this conference. The “irrational public”, often whipped up into a 
punitive frenzy by the media, has been deliberately kept out of the 
frame. (Ryan 1978, Ryan 2003)  
 
The Public Voice and The Policy Making Process 
 
Now, I am not much interested here in asking whether or not this 
determination of the moral community to influence the direction of penal 
policy behind closed doors is arrogant, whether in the UK in particular 
it represents little more, in truth, than a snobbish, middle class, liberal, 
disdain for the views of ordinary people in these matters.  
 
I am, however, interested in asking whether or not such a moral 
community can sustain its influence in our changing democracy, that is 
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to say, to question whether Andrew Rutherford’s description of the 
policy making process is any longer sustainable in large modern 
democracies.  
 
And this question is of pressing importance because if his analysis of what 
drives the penal policy making process is wrong then any strategic 
interventions we might suggest here today to support progressive change 
could be misdirected.  
 
My answer is that I think Rutherford is out of time.  
 
What I mean by this is that the hierarchical society that supported such 
a closed pattern of policy making is changing in the UK and in a 
number of other western democracies. People are less and less prepared 
to leave questions, including difficult penal questions, to their educated 
“masters”.  
 
In short, to argue for what Mill once described (Williams 1976) as the 
value of “superior wisdom” of elites, be it of politicians, pressure 
groups, university professors like Andrew Rutherford, Nils Christie or 
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other administrative experts like Kevin Warner, nowadays cuts far less 
ice in political cultures which are moving away from deference, trusting 
instead to exerting more direct pressure through mechanisms outside of 
the formal political process and its network of consultative committees 
and processes. Sometimes, indeed more often than not, this sentiment, in 
deliberately eschewing expert opinion and the academy, is crudely 
populist (Canovan 1999) 
 
This growing public “independent” voice which stands outside of 
established policy making frameworks, if I can describe it thus, is 
evident across a number of modern democracies, it is a post-modern 
phenomenon that has been extensively researched. Robert Inglehart, for 
example, writes: 
 
“Mass publics have played a role in national politics for long time of 
course, through the ballot and in other ways. Current changes enable 
them to play an increasingly active role in formulating policy, and to 
engage in what might be called “elite - challenging”, as opposed to 
“elite-directed” activities. Elite-directed participation is largely a matter 
of elites mobilising mass support through established organisations such 
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as political parties, labour unions, religious institutions [such as the 
Catholic church], and so on. The newer elite - challenging style of 
politics gives the public an increasingly important role in making 
specific decisions, not just a [mere] choice between two or more sets of 
decision makers. (Inglehart 1997 p 3) 
 
In other words, democratic politics is no longer simply about the mass 
public choosing every few years between two competing sets of elites, 
and then sitting back and waiting for the winning elite to govern in 
Parliament as it think fit– instead the public now seeks to intervene 
between elections on a whole range of specific policies.   
 
This new political clout is partly the result of increased mass education 
and the growth of the information society through new technologies. 
These changes enable the masses to participate more in politics, they 
help ordinary people to acquire the skills (and information) previously 
enjoyed only by those within the formal political and administrative 
networks. One result of this according to Inglehart is that; 
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“Western publics are developing an increasing potential for political 
participation. This change does not imply that mass publics will simply 
show higher rates of participation in traditional activities such as 
voting, but that they may intervene in the political process on a 
qualitatively different level. Increasingly they are likely to demand 
participation in making major decisions, not just a voice in selecting the 
decision makers… These changes have important implications for 
political parties, labor unions and professional organisations; for mass 
politics are increasingly likely to be elite - challenging rather than elite-
directed…..” (Inglehart 1997 p 294) 
 
While it is important to remember that Ingelehart’s research crossed 
several continents, and that England and Wales, Ireland and some 
Nordic countries maybe, for all the decline in deference, are still more 
deferential than Ronald Inglehart’s America, what he is saying has a 
clear resonance for a number of western democracies.  
 
Here parties have become far more responsive to changing public 
sentiment on specific issues as opposed to offering broad, ideologically 
distinctive programmes to the electorate once every four or five years.  
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The force of this change is well illustrated if we reflect back on the 
intense public pressure on the UK Home Office that was generated in 
response to the tragic death of Sarah Payne. It is, of course, easy to 
berate the simplicity of the arguments of many of those who took part in 
this campaign for Sarah’s Law. They initially called for what amounted 
to an unguarded, accessible public register of paedophiles, a simple 
populist solution to what is, in truth, a complex policy problem about 
how to monitor convicted paedophiles, something that governments and 
their expert network of advisory committees, police and probation 
officers  continue to wrestle with.  
 
However, the crucial point is that the scale of this protest demonstrates 
is how easily the public voice can be translated into effective political 
action quite outside of the parties, or indeed, any of the other traditional 
institutions that channel communication between people and 
government in modern democratic societies.  
 
Furthermore, the fact New Labour had to negotiate on this issue is a 
testimony to the claim that there is:  
 19
 
“An upgrading of the public voice in political communication. Instead 
of being positioned only to attend to and overhear the views and 
arguments of others (politicians, journalists, pressure group spokesmen) 
the experience and opinions of quite ordinary people are being aired 
more often.” (Blumler and Gurevitch 1996 p 129)    
 
This upgrading of the public voice is partly a consequence of the growth 
in commercial media outlets from the late 1950s onwards, and new 
media technologies. The days have long since gone when the only voice 
governments in the UK, for example, had to listen to on controversial 
issues like capital punishment was the respectful BBC. The introduction 
of commercial television in 1957 began upgrading the public voice, and 
the truth of the matter is that with the recent arrival of digital networks 
there are so many outlets that any old “riff raff” are invited on air to 
give their views on such subjects, indeed, some even do some agenda 
setting of their own. Or if you cannot get air space to talk about what 
concerns you, why not Email the Prime Minister’s Office, or log on to 
the Downing Street web page?  
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It also needs to be pointed out that these wider, political and cultural 
changes which have upgraded the public voice have been reinforced by 
significant changes within the UK criminal justice system itself. That is 
to say, it seems fairly obvious to me that the repositioning of the public 
voice is a partly a reflection of the simple fact that governments now 
need to engage with the public in a way that was not envisaged in the 
past.   
 
Until recently the machinery of law and order, as we know, was firmly 
in the hands of a highly centralised State and the security of each and 
every one of us was entrusted to, and jealously guarded by, those who 
operated the formal levers of law and order.  
 
This began to change in the 1980s when it became apparent that the 
central state could no longer deliver on law and order from the centre 
and the result has been has been the restructuring of the delivery of 
these services, including penal services, to engage the public. Sometimes 
it engages them in a voluntary rather than a paid capacity, sometimes 
they participate at local level rather than national level.   
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The result is that as individuals and as groups, often in partnership with 
professionals from both the private and public sectors, citizens are 
being invited back into the criminal justice network. (Garland 1996)   
 
The involvement of the “active citizen” in England and Wales leading to 
the “re-invention” of governance in this important aspect of our daily 
lives has been traced by others. (Benyon and Edwards 2001) 
 
This increasing public stake has enhanced the public voice. 
Governments cannot mobilise active citizens and then ignore them.  
 
A dialogue, sometimes it can be both crude and ill informed, is now 
increasingly demanded. The public refuses to be air brushed out of the 
penal equation, it is now more embedded in the architecture of the 
policy making process.   
 
Pulling Things Together 
 
So then, for quite a complex set of reasons western democracies are 
changing; the transmission of public preferences into the heart of 
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government, demanding day by day that more attention be given to 
them, is something that all politicians increasingly have to learn to live 
with, and this most certainly includes those Ministers who make penal 
policy. This has helped to re shape the penal policy making process, 
tilting it outwards rather than inwards. (Ryan 1999; Ryan 2003)  
 
I am, of course, the first to admit that my focus has latterly been a bit 
Anglo centric, and it may be that in our discussion you will suggest that 
political life in the Republic is much the same as it always has been, and 
that established policy making processes can still be taken for granted. 
So, to re - locate one of my examples, it may be that Irish people are still 
happy to stand back and leave management of child abuse to traditional 
forms of authority, the Catholic church, its national politicians and the 
department of justice…Or it may just be that populist pressures are 
easier to resist in a more deferential, conservative society.  
 
I would therefore need to give more attention than I have so far 
managed to the growing body of work on the Republic’s penal policy 
making processes to be confident of making any judgement. (O’Donnell 
2008; Rogan 2008; Behan 2010)   
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And I can understand why people in the Republic might take some 
comfort from holding on to this position. 
 
The prospect of paying more attention to the public voice in an age of 
what Thomas Mathiesen (1995) has labelled “communicative 
irrationality” is not at all promising.  
 
Yet, if you continue to keep faith, as I do, with Mill’s demand that a 
meaningful democracy must include the promise of widespread political 
education in all matters of public policy, then we have a political duty 
pay to serious attention to engaging with the public voice, or else penal 
policy will simply degenerate into a form of crude penal populism. 
 
This means not only that progressive forces must work harder, but also 
that they must work differently to accommodate these changes in the 
policy making process. That is to say, they no longer have the 
government all to themselves in the corridors of power over tea and 
biscuits, so to speak, they must mobilise consent by increasingly 
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engaging outwards with the public voice, the consumers of criminal 
justice. 
 
Of course, suggesting this outward looking strategy for the moral 
community is no easy business, nobody is suggesting that it is, again not 
least in the UK, which  more than in most other European countries, 
has a mostly right wing populist press, now assiduously cultivated by all 
the major political parties, that makes “communicative rationality” 
difficult. (Downes 1991) Who would rather not look inwards than 
confront marauding parents using children who can barely walk in 
their ill- informed crusade against paedophiles named and shamed by 
the red top The News of the World? Add to this malign press influence a  
political culture which, since the mobilisation of the Bloody Code in the 
eighteenth century, has secured wider political change in Britain around 
the rhetoric and symbols of law and order (Hall et al 1978) and the 
difficulties of engaging in a constructive dialogue with the public 
becomes readily apparent.  
 
However, Golding (1995) has done well to remind us that there are 
other more optimistic views about the possibility of a “communicative 
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rationality” around the emergence of the new technologies and new 
social movements which suggest a more vibrant, progressive, less purely 
nationally focussed, homogeneous “public voice(s)” than we sometimes 
suppose. So there is some hope for Thomas Mathiesen’s “alternative” 
public forum (Mathiesen 1995 pp8 - 9). If people, often young and 
poorly resourced people, can organise across national boundaries and 
mobilise against world trade negotiators using the new technologies I 
fail to see why others cannot do the same on narrower terrain. Indeed, 
there are already a number of quite sophisticated “alternative” web 
sites on penal questions, including capital punishment (Roberts et al 
2002). This encouragement, however, does comes with the warning that 
this “alternative” public can all too easily degenerate into a small group 
of activists talking to themselves; which was where we came in, so to 
speak.  
 
So, the moral community needs to engage more. Without reaching out to 
the active citizen, by making more use of Mike Hough’s research, for 
example, which shows that if properly informed the public voice(s) is not 
as crude or as homogeneous as the tabloids represent it, the moral 
community will be left simply reacting to punitive populist responses 
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(Hough and Roberts 1998). Of course, conventional “policy 
communities” as political scientists define them are still in place and will 
continue to be used.  
 
However, in late modernity where the power of the public voice(s) is 
growing, a far more proactive approach is needed and a successful 
strategy needs to involve more than just making sure that members of 
the moral community are in the “right” places talking to the “right” 
people. (Ryan 2003) In the UK certainly, where the prison population is 
projected to rise to over 95,000 by 2015, there is a lot of ground to be 
recovered.  
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